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Abstract
We investigate implementations of the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein scheme of
playing quantum games beyond strategic games. The scope of our research are
decision problems, i.e., one-player extensive games. The research is based on the
examination of their features when the decision problems are carried out via the
EWL protocol. We prove that unitary operators can be adapted to play the role of
strategies in decision problems with imperfect recall. Furthermore, we prove that
unitary operators provide the decision maker possibilities that are inaccessible for
classical strategies.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.Ac
1 Introduction
We present two new applications of the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) protocol [1].
The subject of applications are decision problems with imperfect recall. Two studied
applications correspond to two main issues concerning such problems. The former deals
with the problem of no outcome-equivalence between mixed and behavioral strategies
that arises in games with imperfect recall. We prove that extending the set of actions
to unitary operators may remove this non-equivalence. The latter part of our paper
concerns the problem of payoff maximization in the well-known decision problem called
the paradox of absentminded driver. We reexamine the unitary operators treated as
actions in the EWL scheme applied to the paradox. We show that application of general
unitary operators yields benefit to the decision maker. The strategy space SU(2) allows
the decision maker to get payoffs that are inaccessible by any classical strategy. We
also study the generalized EWL protocol extended to more than two qubits and we
demonstrate that some decision problems can be treated by this generalized scheme.
2 Preliminaries to game theory
Definitions in this section are derived from [2] and [3]. Readers who are not familiar
with game theory are encouraged to get acquainted with these books. The main object
that we are interested in is a decision problem. It is based on the formal definition of
the extensive game [2] where only one player acts. We restrict this term as much as it
is sufficient to be within the scope of our study.
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Definition 2.1 A decision problem is a triple Γ = 〈H, u, I〉 where:
1. H is a finite set of sequences called histories that satisfies the following two prop-
erties:
(a) The empty sequence ∅ is a member of H.
(b) If (ak)k=1,2,...,K ∈ H and K > 1 then (ak)k=1,2,...,K−1 ∈ H.
A history (ak)k=1,2,...,K ∈ H is interpreted as a feasible sequence of actions taken
by the decision maker. The history (a1, a2, . . . , aK) ∈ H is terminal if there is no
(a1, a2, . . . , aK , a) ∈ H. The sets of nonterminal and terminal histories are denoted
by D and Z respectively. The set of actions available to the decision maker after
a nonterminal history h is defined by A(h) = {a : (h, a) ∈ H}.
2. u : Z → R is a utility function which assigns a number (payoff) to each of the
terminal histories.
3. The set of information sets, which is denoted by I, is a partition of D with the
property that for all h, h′ in the same cell of the partition A(h) = A(h′). Every
information set Ii of the partition corresponds to the state of decision maker’s
knowledge. When the decision maker when makes move after certain history h
belonging to Ii, she knows that the course of events of the decision problem takes
the form of one of histories being part of this information set. She does not know,
however, if it is the history h or the other history from Ii.
The main method for describing decisions taken by a decision maker is based on planning
actions before she starts with her first move. Every such plan is called a pure strategy:
Definition 2.2 A pure strategy s is a function which assigns to every history h ∈ D an
element of A(h) with the restriction that if h and h′ are in the same information set,
then s(h) = s(h′).
Let us denote by e(h) experience of the decision maker. It is the sequence of information
sets and actions of the decision maker along the history h. According to [3], a decision
problem has imperfect recall if there exists an information set that contains histories h
and h′ for which e(h) 6= e(h′) i.e., a decision maker forgets some information about the
succession of the information sets and (or) some of her own past moves that she knew
earlier.
The strategy set of a decision maker can be extended to random strategies. There
are two ways of randomizing. One of them, known from strategic games, specifies
probability distribution over the set of pure strategies and is called mixed strategy. The
other specifies probability distribution over the actions available to decision maker at
each information set:
Definition 2.3 A behavioral strategy b is a function which assigns to every history
h ∈ D a probability distribution b(h) over A(h) such that b(h) = b(h′) for any two
histories h and h′ which belong to the same information set.
Since different randomization of strategies may imply the same utility payoff, a possi-
bility to measure what result particular strategy produces is required:
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Definition 2.4 Let mixed or behavioral strategy σ in a decision problem be given. The
outcome O(σ) of σ is the probability distribution over the terminal histories induced by
σ. If two different strategies σ and σ′ induce the same outcome then they are outcome-
equivalent.
The behavioral and mixed strategy ways of randomization are outcome-equivalent in
decision problems (more generally in extensive games) with perfect recall. In problems
with imperfect recall some outcomes may be obtained only through a mixed strategy
or only through a behavioral strategy (see [2] and [5]). This issue will be studied in
Section 4.
3 EWL scheme for quantum 2× 2 strategic game
The generalized Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein scheme [1] is defined by the following com-
ponents:
1. an entangling operator J composed of the identity operator I and Pauli opera-
tor σx:
J =
1√
2
(I ⊗ I + iσx ⊗ σx), (1)
2. unitary operators Uj , j = 1, 2, from the space SU(2) of the form [6]:
Uj(θ, α, β) = cos
θj
2
Aj + sin
θj
2
Bj for θj ∈ [0, pi], (2)
where Aj and Bj are defined as follows:
Aj|0〉 = eiαj |0〉, Aj|1〉 = e−iαj |1〉;
Bj|0〉 = ei(pi2−βj)|1〉, Bj |1〉 = ei(pi2+βj)|0〉, for α, β ∈ [0, 2pi).
3. a payoff function E(u) defined as expected value of a discrete random variable u
with the values {ukl ∈ R2 : k, l = 0, 1} being payoffs associated with the outcomes
of a classical bimatrix 2× 2 game, and the probability distribution pkl defined by
|〈ψf |kl〉|2 where |ψf 〉 = J†(U1 ⊗ U2)J |00〉 and {|kl〉}k,l∈{0,1} is the computational
base of C2 ⊗ C2:
E(u)(U1 ⊗ U2) =
∑
k,l∈{0,1}
ukl|〈ψf |kl〉|2. (3)
As operators Uj depend on parameters θj , αj , βj we will sometimes denote payoff
function E(u)(U1 ⊗ U2) as E(u)(θ1, α1, β1, θ2, α2, β2). If each terminal history h of
a decision problem will be associated with some outcome oh instead of some value
of u(h) we will write E(O).
In the EWL protocol two players select local operators from (2) and each of them act
on their own qubit initially prepared in the |0〉 state. For a more detailed description
we encourage the reader to get acquainted with the prototype of the EWL scheme in [1]
and other papers, for example [7], [8] where authors have investigated properties of the
EWL protocol and compared them with the classical 2× 2 game.
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Figure 1: Examples of decision problems with imperfect recall.
4 Decision problems with imperfect recall via EWL
scheme
The EWL scheme devised initially for a symmetric game Prisoner’s Dilemma has already
been used for 2×2 games with different properties in [7] and [9], and games with a bigger
number of strategies available to players [10]. Let us consider player’s knowledge in
a strategic game at the moment of taking an action. It is the same as in the case of
extensive games the property of which is that, players do not have a possibility to watch
the opponents’ move. Another similarity manifests itself, for instance, in a decision
problem when a decision maker has forgotten the actions chosen in some of previous
stages. Thus, such examples indicate a possibility of applying the EWL protocol to this
type of games as well. Our aim is to adjust the EWL scheme to quantize two well-known
decision problems with imperfect recall.
4.1 Application 1
The first example is taken from [2]. A decision maker is faced with a choice between
two possibilities. When she makes a move, she has a choice of two actions once more.
A significant feature of this problem is that before taking another action the decision
maker forgets what action she has chosen previously. Therefore, this problem exhibits
imperfect recall. The formal description 〈H,O, I〉 of this example according to Definition
2.1 (with a small substitution of the payoff function u by an outcome function O) is as
follows:
H = {∅, a0, a1, (a0, b0), (a0, b1), (a1, b0), (a1, b1)};
O(ak, bl) = okl, where k, l ∈ {0, 1}, I = {∅, {a0, a1}}. (4)
The decision problem in a ‘tree’ language is shown in Figure 1a. As we have mentioned
in preliminaries, the decision maker has two different ways to precise her decision -
expressed as mixed strategies or as behavioral strategies. Her set of pure strategies is
{a0b0, a0b1, a1b0, a1b1} where the first (second) entry of akbl means an action taken by the
decision maker when she is in the first (second) information set. Thus, she can choose
mixed strategy as a probability distribution over akbl. On the other hand the decision
maker can specify an independent probability measure over actions available at each
information set i.e., her behavioral strategy is of the form ((p, 1 − p), (q, 1 − q)). This
example shows no outcome-equivalence between mixed and behavioral strategies. To be
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precise, there are outcomes induced by some mixed strategies that are not achievable
by any behavioral strategy. To see this, let us consider an outcome of the form p1o00 +
(1− p1)o11, p ∈ (0, 1). This outcome is obtained from a mixed strategy (p1, 0, 0, 1− p1).
However, no behavioral strategy can yield this outcome. To see this, notice that any
behavioral strategy ((p, 1 − p), (q, 1 − q)) must assign probability p(1 − q) equal 0 to
yield the outcome p1o00 + (1− p1)o11. It implies that the probability of obtaining either
o00 or o11 is equal 0.
Let us take a look how the EWL scheme can be applied to the problem described above.
Looking at the game tree we can see that this problem has the same structure as an
extensive form of a 2 × 2 strategic game. The decision maker before making her first
move takes on the role of the player 1 and afterwards takes an action available for the
player 2. As she has forgotten the action taken previously, she has the same knowledge
of the game as players in 2 × 2 game. It is therefore natural to adapt to this problem
the EWL scheme when the decision maker chooses some unitary operator U1 with which
she acts on the first qubit |ϕ〉1 and subsequently applies a unitary operator U2 on the
second qubit |ϕ〉2. Then a payoff is calculated through the formula (3). The formal
description of this problem in a manner comparable to (4) is as follows:
H ′ = {∅, U1|ϕ〉1, (U1|ϕ〉1, U2|ϕ〉2)};
u′ = E(O)(U1 ⊗ U2), I ′ = {{|ϕ〉1}, {|ϕ〉2}}. (5)
It should be emphasized that we do not try to identify each component from Definition
2.1 with components of (5). Specification (5) takes on the informal character. It is
aimed at organizing our deliberations. The main feature of the EWL scheme is that it
comprises corresponding classical game i.e., there exists a set of unitary operators that
yield the same outcomes as classical strategies. That is, classical actions can be realized
via I and iσx as it has been shown, for example, in [9]. The decision maker’s strategies
are not single actions in the problem (5), however. They are plans that describe what
does the decision maker do in each of her two information sets (see Definition 2.2), i.e.,
what unitary action she performs on each of two qubits individually. Therefore, her set
of pure classical strategies can be described as {I ⊗ I, I ⊗ iσx, iσx ⊗ I, iσx ⊗ iσx}. Then
a classical mixed strategy can be obtained by
√
p1I ⊗ I +√p2I ⊗ iσx +√p3iσx ⊗ I +√p4iσx ⊗ iσx (6)
where |√pi|2 are the values of some probability mass function (notice that √pi can take
complex values). In general case a (pure) unitary strategy takes the form U1(θ1, α1, β1)⊗
U2(θ2, α2, β2). In games represented by bimatrices the equivalence (with respect to out-
comes that can be achieved) between classical actions and some fixed unitary operators
is sufficient to claim that a quantum realization generalizes the classical game. In ex-
tensive games, particularly in the decision problem (5), it seems natural to find unitary
strategies that realize classical behavioral strategies, not only mixed strategies. Follow-
ing [9], we know that a unitary strategy U1(θ1, 0, 0) ⊗ U2(θ2, 0, 0) must imitate some
classical move of the decision maker. This strategy corresponds exactly to classical be-
havioral strategy ((p, 1− p), (q, 1− q)). If we assume p ≡ cos2(θ1/2) and q ≡ cos2(θ1/2),
we obtain from (3):
E(O)(θ1, θ2) =
∑
k,l∈{0,1}
okl cos
2
(
θ1 − kpi
2
)
cos2
(
θ2 − lpi
2
)
. (7)
Since one-parameter operators Uj(θj , 0, 0) implement classical moves, a natural question
arises: what is the role of wider range of unitary strategies in the decision problem (5)?
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The answer to this question is surprising: Extension of the set of behavioral strategies
to the set SU(2)⊗SU(2) causes outcome-equivalence of behavioral strategies with mixed
strategies. Notice that this problem is not trivial because there is no identity of the
expression (6) and U1(θ1, α1, β1)⊗U2(θ2, α2, β2). For example, if one puts √p1 = √p4 =
1√
2
and
√
p2 =
√
p3 = 0, there is no representation of (6) in the form of the tensor
product of (2). On the other hand when we take, for example, α1 = α2 6= 0 then the
tensor product U1(θ1, α1, β1) ⊗ U2(θ2, α2, β2) has not the form of a mixed strategy for
any angles θ1, θ2, β1, β2. However, the following statement is true:
Proposition 4.1 For any mixed strategy of a decision maker in the decision problem
(5) there is an outcome-equivalent pure unitary strategy.
Proof. The set of outcomes yielded by all mixed strategies is a convex hull of ele-
ments {o00, o01, o10, o11} due to the expression for a mixed strategy (6) or, equivalently,
a mixed strategy of the decision problem (4). We will prove that any convex com-
bination
∑
k,l∈{0,1} pklokl can be written as an expected outcome E(O)(U1 ⊗ U2) =∑
k,l∈{0,1} okl|〈ψf |kl〉|2 for some unitary operations U1 and U2 from SU(2). At first
let us consider the case p00 = p11 = 0 or p01 = p10 = 0. Then the convex com-
bination
∑
k,l∈{0,1} pklokl is a segment p01o01 + p10o10 or p00o00 + p11o11, respectively.
Putting U1(0, α1, 0) ⊗ U2(0, 0, 0) we get E(O) = o00 cos2 α1 + o11 sin2 α1 that is a seg-
ment linking points o00 and o11. Similarly, if we take U1(pi, 0, β1)⊗U2(0, 0, 0) we obtain
o01 sin
2 β1 + o10 cos
2 β1. Now, let us examine general convex combination of points okl
such that p00 + p11 6= 0 and p01 + p10 6= 0. The combination E(O) associated with
U1(θ1, α1, β1)⊗ U2(0, 0, 0) is of the form:
(
o00 cos
2 α1 + o11 sin
2 α1
)
cos2
θ1
2
+
(
o01 sin
2 β1 + o10 cos
2 β1
)
sin2
θ1
2
. (8)
Comparing the coefficients of the combination
∑
k,l∈{0,1} pklokl and (8) we obtain the
system of equations that has a unique solution:
cos2
θ1
2
= p00 + p11, cos
2 α1 =
p00
p00 + p11
, cos2 β1 =
p10
p01 + p10
. (9)
The result (9), together with the first case, finishes the proof. 
Notice that the unitary strategies used in the proof depend only on an operation on the
first qubit. Due to the fact that the qubits are maximally entangled every outcome can
be obtained by performing an operation only on the first or only on the second qubit.
4.2 Application 2
The next example in which we are going to use the EWL scheme is based on [3]. As the
previous example, this one also shows difference between reasoning based on mixed and
behavioral strategies. The application is dealing with the well-known imperfect recall
problem called the paradox of absentminded driver. Our research is not the first attempt
to put this problem into quantum domain. The first one appeared in [11]. The authors
of this paper presented the way of quantization with the use of the Marinatto and Weber
scheme of playing quantum 2 × 2 games [12] - the initial state plays the main role. In
outline, for many kinds of the absentminded driver problems various initial states are
chosen to maximize the driver’s payoff. Therefore, we expect that no other protocol
could be ahead of [11] in terms of maximization of the driver’s payoff. However, the
quantum version based on the EWL protocol turns out to be a convenient way to make
an analysis of some complicated cases of the problem of absentminded driver.
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4.2.1 The paradox of absentminded driver.
The name of this decision problem is derived from a certain story describing this issue.
An individual sitting for some time in a pub eventually decides to go back home. The
way is leading through the motorway with two subsequent exits. The first exit leads to
a catastrophic area (payoff 0). The choice of the other one will lead the decision maker
home (payoff λ > 2). If he continues his journey along the motorway not choosing
any of the exits, he will not be able to go back home but he has a possibility to stay
for the night at a motor lodge (payoff 1). The key determinant is the driver’s absent-
mindedness. This means that when he arrives at the exit he is not able to tell if it is
the first or the second exit due to his absent-mindedness. This situation is described on
Figure 1b. The formal description is as follows:
H = {∅, a0, a1, (a1, a0), (a1, a1), }, I = {∅, a1};
u(a0) = 0, u(a1, a0) = λ, u(a1, a1) = 1. (10)
Let us determine decisions that the driver can make. Since the decision maker has just
one information set, according to Definition 2.2, only two pure strategies are available
to him: ‘exit’ or ‘motorway’ with respective terminal histories a0 and (a1, a1). Similarly,
behavioral strategy of the driver will be represented by the same random device in each
of the two nodes of the information set i.e., it is on the form (p, 1 − p) where p is the
probability of choosing ‘exit’. Notice first that the driver plans his journey still sitting
in the bar which is equivalent to choosing some pure strategy. The optimal strategy is
‘motorway’ (with corresponding payoff 1) which becomes paradoxical when the decision
maker begins carrying out this pure strategy. It is better for him, when he approaches
an exit, to go away from the motorway because he comes to a conclusion that with equal
probability he is at the first or the second exit. Consequently, his optimal choice will be
a certain behavioral strategy. For example if λ = 4, the expected payoff corresponding
to the strategy (p, 1 − p) is expressed by u(p, 1 − p) = (1 − p)(1 + 3p). Maximizing
u(p, 1 − p) we conclude that the optimal decision for the decision maker is to choose
‘exit’ with probability 1/3 each time he encounters an intersection, which corresponds
to the expected payoff 4/3. As in the previous example, here as well we can notice lack
of equivalence between behavioral and mixed strategies. This time, however, behavioral
strategy is strictly better than mixed one as it ensures strictly higher payoff for the
driver. Observe, however, that condition λ > 2 is essential for this case. Otherwise,
p = 0 maximizes the expected payoff u(p, 1− p) which is equal 1.
Now, we are going to implement the EWL protocol to this problem. It is possible
since in the classical example we have again a decision problem with two stages. More-
over, actions are taken independently at each of these stages as in the 2 × 2 bimatrix
game. Further, each player in the 2× 2 game has not any knowledge of an action taken
by his opponent. Therefore, this is the same situation as if the decision maker was in the
role of the player 1 and then the player 2, and he forgot his previous move. Let us assign
the state after each action of the classical decision problem with the computational base
of respective qubit. States induced by actions: ‘exit’ and ‘motorway’ available after
history ∅ correspond to |0〉 and |1〉 states of the first qubit |ϕ〉1. Similarly, we assign
states after actions from A(a1) (see Definition 2.1) to base states of the second qubit
|ϕ〉2. Notice that this is the obvious procedure applied in quantum 2×2 bimatrix games
where outcomes are assigned to base states |kl〉 where k, l ∈ {0, 1}. We assume, as in
the classical case, that in the quantum realization the driver is unable to distinguish to
which qubit he applies a unitary action. Therefore, the two qubits are in the informa-
tion set. It implies that the same unitary operation U is applied to both qubits. More
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formally:
H ′ = {∅, U |ϕ〉1, (U |ϕ〉1, U |ϕ〉2)}, I ′ = {|ϕ〉1, |ϕ〉2};
E(u)
(
U⊗2
)
= λ|〈ψf |10〉|2 + 1|〈ψf |11〉|2 and |ψf 〉 = J†U⊗2J |00〉. (11)
The core of the issue lies in the payoff function E(u). If state |0〉 on the first qubit
is measured (which corresponds to choosing ‘exit’ at the first intersection), the payoff
assigned to this state equals 0 regardless of the state measured on the second qubit.
Therefore, in (11) the expected payoff E(u) includes 0 (|〈ψf |00〉|2 + |〈ψf |01〉|2). Thus, so
defined quantum realization generalizes the classical case. The classical pure strategies
can be again implemented by I and iσx which correspond to ‘exit’ and ‘motorway’,
respectively. These strategies imply operations I⊗2 and (iσx)⊗2 on both qubits that
are indistinguishable by the decision maker, and produce outcomes equal to classical
ones. Although we have assumed that the result 0 on the first qubit determine payoff
0, we always have to specify operations on both qubits. Like in the classical case,
also here decision maker’s strategy have to precise an action in every possible state
of a decision problem. As in the previous example one-parameter operation U(θ, 0, 0)
matches classical behavioral strategy and we have:
E(u)(θ) = λ sin2
θ
2
cos2
θ
2
+ 1 sin4
θ
2
. (12)
If we replace cos2(θ/2) by p in the formula (12) we obtain expected payoff that corre-
sponds to the classical behavioral strategy (p, 1− p) in the decision problem (10). From
the classical case (10) we already know that the driver can obtain the maximal payoff
which is 4/3 when λ = 4, using operators of the type U(θ, 0, 0). Let us investigate if the
decision maker can benefit when the range of his actions is extended to any operator
of the form (2). Assume that the driver has two-parameter set of unitary operations
U(θ, α, 0) at his disposal. Then the expected payoff is as follows:
E(u)(θ, α) =
1
4
λ(sin 2α+ 1) sin θ +
(
sin(2α) cos2
θ
2
− sin2 θ
2
)2
(13)
If the driver applies U(pi/2, pi/4, 0) to his both qubits, the expected payoff equals λ/2.
Coming back to the case λ = 4, he gets 2 utilities instead of 4/3. Moreover, this is
the highest payoff which the driver can guarantee himself by using any unitary opera-
tions (2). To prove this, we determine the final state |ψf〉 when any unitary operation
U(θ, α, β)⊗2 is given. The matrix representation of |ψf〉 takes the form:
|ψf〉 =


cos 2α cos2
θ
2
+ sin 2β sin2
θ
2
i
(
cos
θ
2
sin
θ
2
(cos(α− β) + sin(α− β)
)
i
(
cos
θ
2
sin
θ
2
(cos(α− β) + sin(α− β)
)
sin 2α cos2
θ
2
− cos 2β sin2 θ
2


. (14)
Therefore, the state |ψf 〉 is a particular case of the state |ψ′f〉 of the form:
|ψ′f〉 =
∑
k,l∈{0,1}
ηkl|kl〉, where ηkl ∈ C,
∑
k,l∈{0,1}
|ηkl|2 = 1 and η01 = η10. (15)
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Figure 2: The n-tuple decision problem of absentminded driver.
Exchanging |ψf 〉 by |ψ′f 〉 in (11), we see that the expected payoff E′(u) equals λ|η10|2 +
|η11|2. Furthermore, we have λ > 2. It implies that the set argmaxηkl(E′(u)) consists of
all points (η10, η11) for which (|η10|2, |η11|2) = (1/2, 0). It is obvious that in the special
case |ψf〉 the equality argmaxψf (E(u)(θ, α, β)) = argmaxψf (|〈ψf |10〉|2) is fulfilled as
well. As we obtain maxψf (|〈ψf |10〉|2) = 1/2, the decision maker can achieve maximal
payoff equal to λ/2. Observe that the maximal payoff that the decision maker can get
in the classical case is λ2/4(λ − 1). This is strictly less than λ/2 if only λ > 2. This
leads us to the conclusion that in the decision problem (10) extended to the quantum
domain there exists the unitary strategy for any λ > 2 that is strictly better than any
classical one.
4.2.2 The n-tuple paradox of absentminded driver.
We have already showed the advantage of quantum strategies over classical ones in the
problem of absentminded driver. Now, we test unitary strategies in the case where the
driver comes across more than one treacherous intersection. At this moment we make an
assumption that the absentminded driver problem is characterized by n+1 intersections
such that the first n intersections are treacherous ones (payoff 0 when ‘exit’ is chosen at
each of these intersections), and only one action ‘exit’ taken at n+1 intersection leads
the driver home (payoff λ). Choosing the action ‘motorway’ all the time yields payoff
1, the same as in (10). This problem is depicted on Figure 2. A formal description of
this classical case is similar to (10). To find an optimal classical strategy we have to
maximize (1−p)n((λ−1)p+1) In quantum version we apply the general EWL protocol
for (n + 1) × (n + 1) bimatrix game where entangling operator J and final state |ψf 〉
take the form given in [4]:
J =
1√
2
(I⊗n+1 + iσ⊗n+1x ), |ψf〉 = J†U⊗n+1J |0〉⊗n+1 (16)
The decision maker carries out some fixed unitary operation U ∈ SU(2) on each of n+1
qubits. In addition, the qubits belong to the same information set:
H ′ = {∅, U |ϕ〉1, (U |ϕ〉1, U |ϕ〉2), . . . , (U |ϕ〉1, U |ϕ〉2, . . . , U |ϕ〉n+1)};
I ′ = {|ϕ〉1, |ϕ〉2, . . . , |ϕ〉n+1};
E(u)
(
U⊗n+1
)
= λ|〈ψf |1〉⊗n|0〉|2 + |〈ψf |1〉⊗n+1|2. (17)
We identify the states after actions ‘exit’ and ‘motorway’ of the decision problem from
Figure 2 with states |0〉 and |1〉, respectively, exactly like in (11). This causes the
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equivalence between the decision problem (17) with unitary operators reduced to one-
parameter operators U(θ, 0, 0) and the classical case, in the same way as in (10) and
(11):
E(θ) = λ cos2
θ
2
sin2n
θ
2
+ sin2(n+1)
θ
2
. (18)
The n payoffs equal 0 could suggest these ones are essential so that the EWL scheme
can generalize the decision problem depicted in Figure 2, but this is not true. In fact,
any decision problem given by the decision tree depicted in Figure 2 can be implemented
by the EWL scheme. (Notice that (10) represents any decision problem given by the
decision tree shown in Figure 1b as it comes down to a problem with payoffs 0, λ, 1
through adding a respective constant to all the payoffs and (or) multiplying all the
payoffs by a respective constant). To demonstrate that the EWL quantum representation
defines correctly any kind of the n-tuple paradox, we assign, instead of fixed payoffs,
outcomes o1, o2, . . . , on+2 to the terminal histories. Then the n-tuple decision problem
takes the form:
H ′ = {∅, a0, a1, . . . , (a11, . . . , an1 , an+10 ), (a11, . . . , an1 , an+11 )};
I ′ = {∅, a1, . . . , (a11, . . . , an1 , an+11 )};
O(a0) = o1, O(a
1
1, . . . , a
t
1, a
t+1
0 ) = ot+1 for t = 1, 2, . . . , n. (19)
Let us denote by |j1, j2, . . . , jn+1〉 ∈
⊗
n+1C
2 an element of the computational base.
For any t = 1, 2, . . . , n a symbol (jt, jt+1, . . . , jn+1)2 denotes the binary representation
of a (decimal) number .
Proposition 4.2 The decision problem (17) with unitary operators U restricted to
U(θ, 0, 0) and expected payoff function E(O) extended to include:
n∑
t=1
ot
2n−t+1−1∑
x=0
|〈ψf |1〉⊗t−1|0〉|x〉|2 where x = (jt+1, jt+2, . . . , jn+1)2 (20)
implements the decision problem (19).
Proof. First we calculate U(θ, 0, 0)⊗n+1J |0〉⊗n+1 where J is defined by (16). Then the
expression
√
2U⊗n+1J |0〉⊗n+1 takes the form:
2n+1−1∑
y=0
(
ir(y) cosn−r(y)+1
θ
2
sinr(y)
θ
2
− in−r(y) cosr(y) θ
2
sinn−r(y)+1
θ
2
)
|y〉 (21)
where the element r(y) depends on y = (j1, j2, . . . , jn+1)2 and is given be the formula
r(y) = j1 + j2 + · · ·+ jn+1. Let us fix any element |y〉 from the computational base and
determine the inner product 〈y|ψf〉. To avoid laborious computation that are necessary
to obtain complete form of the final state |ψf〉 we can choose the following simpler way
to calculate the inner product. We take the bra vector J†y,· = (〈y| − i〈y|)
√
2 where
|y〉 = σ⊗n+1x |y〉. In a language of matrices the element J†y,· is the y-th row of a matrix
representation of J†. Next, let us put P as a label of a projector |y〉〈y|+ |y〉〈y|. Then
〈y|ψf〉 can be expressed as follows:
〈y|ψf〉 = J†y,·PU⊗n+1J |0〉⊗n+1. (22)
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Notice that r(y) and r(y) are connected through equation r(y)+r(y) = n+1. Using this
fact and a result from (21) the amplitude associated with |y〉 of the state U⊗n+1J |0〉⊗n+1
is given by
1√
2
(
ir(y) cosr(y)
θ
2
sinr(y)
θ
2
− in−r(y) cosr(y) θ
2
sinr(y)
θ
2
)
. (23)
In order to complete the state PU⊗n+1J |0〉⊗n+1 we just copy the amplitude of |y〉 from
(21). If we use (22) and (23) we will receive the final form of 〈y|ψf〉:
〈y|ψf〉 = ir(y) cosr(y) θ
2
sinr(y)
θ
2
. (24)
The result (24) together with substitution p = cos2(θ/2) immediately gives us |〈ψf |y〉|2 =
pr(y)(1− p)r(y). After some calculations we conclude from the last result that:
∑
x
|〈ψf |y〉|x〉|2 = pr(y)(1− p)r(y)
∑
x
(
r(x) + r(x)
r(x)
)
pr(x)(1− p)r(x) (25)
The sum on the right-hand side of the equation (25) is the Newtons formula which is
equal 1. Therefore, the formula (25) leads us to a conclusion that for any t = 1, 2, . . . , n
the component assigned to ot of the formula (20) can be expressed as:∑
x
|〈ψf |1〉⊗t−1|0〉|x〉|2 = (1− p)t−1p. (26)
Equation (26) ends the proof as the right-hand side of the equation is a probability of the
outcome ot in the decision problem (19) when a behavioral strategy (p, 1−p) is taken. 
It follows from Proposition 4.2 that every time when we concern the classical problem
depicted on Figure 2 we can consider the problem (17) when unitary operators (2) are
restricted to one-parameter operators U(θ, 0, 0) and the payoff function is given by (18).
Let us return to example (17) where a payoff function is fixed. Let us check if unitary
operators (2) can yield strictly better results than any classical strategies applied to the
problem. In order to do that, we need to determine the expected payoff E(u)(U) defined
in (17) for any U(θ, α, β) ∈ SU(2) . We can find the components |〈ψf |1〉⊗n|0〉|2 and
|〈ψf |1〉⊗n+1|2 of E(u)(U) with the use of equation (22). After simple calculations we
get:
E(u)(U) = λ|i cosn θ
2
sin
θ
2
sin(nα− β) + in cos θ
2
sinn
θ
2
cos(α− nβ)|2
+ 1| cosn+1 θ
2
sin[(n + 1)α] + in+1 sinn+1
θ
2
cos[(n+ 1)β]|2. (27)
Comparing the payoffs (18) and (27) we really ought to expect better results yielded by
3-parameter operators.
Example 4.3 For n = 3 and λ = 20 the maximization result of (18) and (27) is as
follows:
classical scenario: max
θ
E(u)(θ) ≈ E(u)
(
7pi
10
)
≈ 2, 46;
EWL scenario: max
θ,α,β
E(u)(θ, α, β) = E(u)
(
pi
2
,
9pi
16
,
3pi
16
)
= 5.
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This example shows that an increased number of treacherous intersections does not
reduce the ability of the EWL scheme to yield benefit to the decision maker. Moreover,
the ratio maxθ,α,β E(u)(θ, α, β) : maxθ E(u)(θ) grows together with λ. For large n we had
better use some mathematical software to determine the precise result of optimization.
Following proposition assure us that the attempt of finding optimal solution makes sense
for any n:
Proposition 4.4 For any n > 1 in the n-tuple decision problem (17) there exist a num-
ber λ0 > 1, angles: θ
′ ∈ (0, pi) and α′, β ′ ∈ (0, 2pi) such that for any payoff λ′ > λ0 the
unitary strategy U(θ′, α′, β ′) yields a payoff strictly higher than a payoff achieved by any
classical strategy.
Proof. We showed in subsection 4.2.1 the case when n = 1. So we now assume n > 2.
Let us take the decision problem (17). For any n > 2 let us put λ0 = (cos
2n θ′
2
sin2 θ
′
2
)−1
and unitary operator U∗(θ′, α′, β ′) defined by:
θ′ = 2 arccos
1√
n+ 1
, α′ =
(pi + 2piχA(n))n
2(n2 − 1) , β
′ =
pi + 2piχA(n)
2(n2 − 1) . (28)
where χA(n) is an indicator function of a set A = {n : in−1 = −1}. Notice that λ0, θ′, α′
and β ′ all meet the requirements of the proposition. They depend only on n. Further, λ0
is well defined as θ′ /∈ {0, pi}. For any δ > 1 let us denote λ′ = δλ0 the payoff associated
with the problem (17). By putting parameters (28) into formula (27) and comparing it
to (18), and by using the fact that θ′ ∈ argmaxθ
(
cos2 θ
2
sin2n θ
2
)
, we obtain the following
sequence of inequalities:
E(u)(U∗) > λ′
(
cos2n
θ′
2
sin2
θ′
2
+ cos2
θ′
2
sin2n
θ′
2
)
= δ + λ′ cos2
θ′
2
sin2n
θ′
2
> 1 + λ′ cos2
θ′
2
sin2n
θ′
2
> max
θ∈[0,pi]
E(u)(θ), (29)
which completes the proof. 
Let us observe now, how Proposition 4.4 concerns the result of quantization the absent-
minded driver in subsection 4.2.1. A segment of numbers λ in which there exists unitary
strategy strictly better than classical one, is the segment (2,∞). It can be easily proved
that for any λ ∈ R \ (2,∞) the maximal payoff of the decision problem (10) is equal 1
regardless of used unitary strategies. Proposition 4.4 shows that the problem of finding
optimal unitary strategy in decision problems with various numbers of the treacherous
intersections is very much alike.
5 Conclusion
We have found the new use of the EWL protocol beyond strategic 2 × 2 games. It
turns out once again that game theory defined on quantum domain provides results
that are inaccessible in classical game theory. We have confirmed through Proposition
4.4 that we can increase maximal payoff in decision problems carried out via the EWL
scheme. Our research has allowed to formulate Proposition 4.1 that points out another
peculiarity of quantum games. Unitary strategies (2) that include classical behavioral
ones (when they are restricted to one-parameter operators) can be outcome equivalent
to unitary operators implementing classical mixed strategies while behavioral and mixed
strategies are not outcome equivalent in classical decision problems. These surprising
features make quantum games worth further thorough studies.
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